The Bali Police

Police corruption in Indonesia is widespread. For example, a survey of 3,841 respondents by Transparency International Indonesia found that bribes were paid in 48 per cent of all interactions with Indonesian police [11][26]. They topped the list of the country’s most corrupt institutions. Second in the list was Indonesia's customs office: to which 41 per cent of respondents acknowledged paying bribes. 30 per cent of respondents said they paid bribes to Indonesian courts with $14,000 being the average payment.

Although it isn’t hard to imagine how attractive a massive influx of ‘War on Drugs’ funding would be at this level and on these terms, the substantial bribe opportunities which might be expected for a case like this one would also be hugely attractive. Schapelle Corby though refused to even contemplate a bribe at any stage.

POLICE POLITICS
The influx of massive ‘War on Terror’ funding to Bali, which many anticipated following the Bali bombings in 2002, did not materialize. In 2004 though, the prospect of substantial funding via ‘War on Drugs’ investment would undoubtedly be enhanced via a high profile case against a westerner. As an institution, Bali Police therefore would stand to benefit significantly, in terms of both stature and profile, should this investment materialize.

The Chief of Bali Police was I Made Mangku Pastika, who had transferred to this position from his prestigious role as Police Chief of West Papua, shortly following the Bali bombings. Investigation reveals that Mr Pastika had previously been trained in Australia having “attended many AFP training courses” [12]. Indeed, Mr Pastika was reported as being “a personal friend” of Michael Keelty [12], head of the AFP at the time of Schapelle Corby’s case. See information on the AFP later in this paper.

Note that Mr Pastika was subsequently promoted to a position of Head of Narcotics for the entire Indonesian State Police.


Next: Schapelle Corby's 'Trial'

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