Friday, February 6, 2009

International Politics & High Finance

Indonesia is a net recipient of direct and indirect United Nations funding for the international 'War on Drugs' and related crime. Not that the source of this inward investment is limited to just the UN - far from it. Funding is awarded from a variety of international sources.

It is important to understand that ‘War on Drugs’ involves serious money: billions of dollars. One agency alone, the UNODC (UN Office on Drugs and Crime), had an annual official budget of US$332 million last year [8]. One obvious fact stemming from this is that recipient nations seek the biggest cut of this that they can possibly attract.

It is also important to understand that it isn't simply a matter of cash donations. Investment is often allocated via 'projects'. A nation and its regime will benefit fiscally by the very presence of a project office and staff in their territory. It is a complex mix of funding, but it is funding on a truly substantial scale.

Naturally, nations and regimes compete extremely vigorously in this lucrative international 'market'. And, the UNODC, for example, does indeed have a project and project staff in Indonesia [25] [24].

But how do the UN (and the other sources) determine where the investment and money goes? Clearly, they don't just stick a pin in a map and pour money at random. No, it is applied for and in theory it has to be justified. Recipient nations will have to demonstrate that there is a major drug production, import, or export issue. The stakes are extremely high.

High profile cases like Schapelle Corby's, the first ever Australia to Indonesia smuggling case in history, are therefore extremely valuable. This fact frames the mood music to the whole show trial and subsequent events.

INDONESIAN CORRUPTION
Corruption is a major problem in Indonesia. Scratch the surface with Google and detailed reports are presented aplenty describing this.

Such is the level of corruption that the United States government’s official website states that “Indonesia has laws against official corruption and an effective anti-corruption commission; but despite these laws, corruption in Indonesia is endemic.” and that “Corruption of Indonesia’s judiciary is pervasive and poses a significant threat to the country’s counter drug strategy” [9].

The UN should always make sure that before allocating any investment at all, the recipient regime has a robust and corruption free judicial system in place. But they don't. They should make sure that there is no scope for corruption before allocating investments, as should all inward investors to regimes like this one. But they don't.

Indeed, in June 2008, even one of the UN's own agencies (UNDP: The United Nations Development Programme) published a report describing a new initiative in this area, under the helpful title “UNDP’s Anti Corruption Activities in Indonesia” [10]. Good work… but what about 2004/5?

The implication of all this, of course, is that it isn't only the higher echelons of the regime’s apparatus who may gain advantage from the investment and funding obtained. With corruption demonstrably rife, such investment creates a bigger pot for a substantial number of operatives to feed from.

In 2004/5 there was therefore significant motive in place at almost every level within the system. There was an inherent culture in place which itself supported and promoted this motive.

Tragically, Schapelle Corby found herself in the middle of this corrupt motivational and high finance mire. What followed was: the show trial, the legal and human rights abuses, the terrible inhumane sentence, the burning of the evidence…


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